Wednesday, 7 November 2012

Meltz paper at Stllar



Meltzoff, A.N., Kuhl, P.K., Movellan, J., and Sejnowski., T.J. (2009)
Foundations for a new science of learning
Science, 325, 284-288

p284 'Human learning and cultural evolution are supported by a paradoxical adaptation. We are born immature. During the first year if life , the brain of an infant is teeming with structural activity' with sensory processes developing before higher activity'

'Three principles are emerging from cross-disciplinary work in psychology, neuroscience, machine learning, and education, contributing to a new science of learning'  and, in particular, are useful for explaining,, language and social understanding.
1.    Learning is computational, implicit
2.    Learning is social, implicit
3.    Learning  is supported by brain circuits linking perception and action
1. Learning is computational
' infants and young children possess powerful computational skills that allow them to automatically infer structural models of their environment from the statistical patterns they experience' eg 'before they are three, children use frequency distributions to learn which phonetic units distinguish words in their native language' p 285 ' Statistical regularities and co variations in the world thus provide a richer source of information than previously thought' and the learning    running around these regularities is implicit. ' Learning from probabilistic input provides an alternative to Skinnerian reinforcement learning and Chomskian nativist accounts' of learning
2. Learning is social
p285 'Children do not compute statistics indiscriminately. Social cues highlight what and when to learn'  young infants 'more readily learn and enact an event when it is produced by a person than be an inanimate device. Machine learning studies show that systematically increasing a robot's social-like behaviours and contingent responsivity elevates young children's willingness to connect with it and learn from it'
3. Learning is supported by brain circuits linking perception and action
' Human social and language learning are supported by neural-cognitive systems that link the actions of self and other.'  The brain areas responsible for initiation of movement and its action overlap. ' Social learning, imitation, and sensorimotor experience may initially generate, as well as modify and refine, shared neural circuitry for perception and action'.  KRO to what extent and what is the nature of 'the close coupling and attunement between self and other, which is the hallmark of seamless social communication and interaction'

Social learning and understanding
Three social skills are foundational
1.    Imitation
2.    Shared attention
3.    Empathy and social emotions
 Imitation
'Learning by observing and imitating experts in the culture is a powerful social learning mechanism' ' Imitation if faster than individual discovery and safer than trial and error learning' ' Children can use third person information ( observation of others) to create first person knowledge. This is an accelerator for learning: Instead of having to work out causal relationships themselves children can learn from watching experts' ' Imitative learning is valuable because the behavioural actions of others "like me" serve as a proxy for one's own' ' Children do not slavishly duplicate what they see but reenact a person's goals and intentions' ie ' they produce the goal that the adult was striving to achieve, not the unsuccessful attempts. Children choose whom, when, and what to imitate and seamlessly mix imitation and self discovery to solve novel problems'  attempts in robotics to emulate infant imitation include direct (input-action) and more recently goal based approaches .
 Shared attention
'Social learning is facilitated when people share attention. Shared attention to the same object or event provides a common ground for communication and teaching. An early component of shared attention is gaze following' experimental evidence to show that ' we project our own experience onto others'. P286  ' The ability to interpret the behaviour the behaviour and experience of others by using oneself as a model is a highly effective learning strategy that may be unique to human........It would be useful if this could be exploited in machine  learning'
Empathy and social emotions
' The capacity to feel and regulate emotions is critical '  ' In humans, many affective       processes are uniquely social'. Children will even help and comfort a social robot that was crying Tanaka,Cicourel,Movellan, 2007) 'Brain imaging studies in adults show an overlap in the neural systems activated when people  receive a painful stimulus themselves or perceive that another person is in pain  Hein & Singer (2008) These neural reactions are modulated by cultural experience, training, and perceived similarity between self and other Hein & Singer (2008)

Language Learning  - as shedding light on the interaction between computational learning, social facilitation of learning, and shared neural circuitry for perception and production.
Evidence to show that developing infants pick up the statistical regularities of a language leading to neural commitment. ' However, experiments also show that the computations involved in language learning are "gated" by social processes (Kuhl, 2007). In foreign language learning experiments, social interaction strongly influenced infants' statistical learning. Infants exposed to a foreign language at 9 months learn rapidly, but only when experiencing the new language during social interchanges with other humans. 'Temporal contingencies may be critical'.
Idea of neural commitment

A similar pattern , ' passerine  birds learn conspecific song by listening to and imitating adult birds' ' In birds, as in humans, a social context enhances vocal learning'.






M & D (2003)


Andrew N. Meltzoff and Jean Decety (2003)
What imitation tells us about social cognition: a reapproachment between developmental psychology and cognitive neuroscience
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B , 358, 491-500

P491 ‘Through imitating others, the human young come to understand that others not only share behavioural states, but are ‘like me’ in deeper ways as well’.

P494 ‘Imitation seems to be intrinsically coupled with empathy for others, broadly construed’

‘The holy grail for cognitive and neuroscience theories of imitation is to elucidate the mechanism by which infants connect the felt but unseen movement of the self with the seen but unfelt movement of the other’.

Developmental psychology approach and evidence

Imitation as innate? Newborns imitate

P492  imitation is ‘part of innate endowment of humans’ imitation in the newborn has been shown in 14 independent labs. P493 ‘There is an innate link between the perception and production of human acts’
12-21 day infants could imitate four gestures ‘ infants confused neither actions nor body parts’ also p 492 ‘It is as if young infants isolate what part of their body to move before how to move it’ ie there is ‘organ identification’
‘infants can store a model and imitate from memory …… which requires more than a simple visual-motor resonance’

Self-other relations. Awareness of self
Knowing you are being imitated requires being aware of self.
p494 ‘ The infancy work shows that young babies correct their imitative behaviour which suggests active comparison between self and other ( Meltzoff and Moore, 1997)
‘a listener often shows interpersonal connectedness with a speaker by adopting the postural configuration of the speaker’

Can infants recognise when another acts ‘like me’?
What is the emotional value of the experience?

Exp:
C1. One adult imitated the baby 
C2. Another adult imitated the previous baby ( therefore each adult acted like a perfect baby)
Results:  For C1 cf C2.  baby smiled more, looked at adult for longer, directed testing behaviour at the adult.

Older infants and sharedness  p494-495 ‘ the relationship is being abstractly considered’ ….. ‘ the abstract notion that the other is doing the same as me’

Goals and intentions
(KR0 sharing attention etc hinges on being able to determine intention and hence why realness might be important)

P495 “ In the mature adult notion, persons have internal mental states – such as beliefs, goals, and intentions – that predict and explain human actions’

P493 humans do not simply resonate, however. Our goals affect how we process stimuli in the world’ i.e. intention determines pattern of neural representation

Exp:
C1: show infants an unsuccessful act – at 18 months ‘ can infer the unseen goals implied by unsuccessful atempts’ ….. ‘ they choose to imitate what we meant to do rather than what we mistakenly did do’

Human v.  non human
This was repeated using a mechanical device that traced the same spatio-temporal path ‘infants did not attribute goals or intentions in this case’

P497 “ This developmental research shows that infants distinguished between what the adult meant to do and what he actually did they ascribed goals to human acts, indeed, they inferred the goal even when it was not attained. The differentiation between behaviour versus goals and intentions lies at the core of our mentalizing, and it underlies our moral judgements

Neuroscience approach and evidence

P 491 ‘monkeys do not imitate’ but they do have mirror units. But whether mirror units are innately present  or the result of associative learning is not known ( as of 2003)

Kinds of questions to ask p 495 “ What is the neural basis for distinguishing the self’s imitation of the other from the other’s imitation of the self?’ – the situation in the physical world is the same – there are two bodies in correspondence with one another.

Missing p491 ‘ how a neural mirror system begets theory of mind’

Experiments and experimental manipulations
1.  Observing the actions of others

2. Future action v future recognition
·       Remembering for future action
·       Remember for future recognition

3. Animate v. inanimate
·       Observe real person
·       Observe in animate

4. Self – other
4a. Imaging actions
·       Own
·       Others
4b doing actions
·       Imitate others actions
·       See others imitate own actions

5. Means and goals ( LEGO block exp)
·       Goal achived condition  only
·       Means only
·       Whole action
·       & control conditions

Ventral premotor
(Mirror units monkeys)
STS
(Mirror units monkeys)
premotor – somotropic
observing actions of others (1)
remember for future action (Decety work) (2)
left premotor
observe an achieved goal (5)
parietal (right and left)
Observing actions of others  (1)
remember for future action (Decety) (2)
left parietal
Imaging actions ( own) ie self (4a)
intention ( human actions only -  not inanimate from exp comparing animate and inanimate) (3)
imitate others actions  (4b)
right parietal
imagining others actions (4b)
see others imitate own actions (4b)
posterior cingulated
imagining others actions (4a)
fronto polar cortex
imagining others actions (4a)
medial prefrontal cortex
imitate  others actions (4b)
see others imitate own actions (4b)
differentiated means only from goal only condition of  Exp 5.  nb from other research areas plays a critical role in inferencing ie need to be able to observe the means in order to make inferences.
Right dorso lateral prefrontal
Both means and goals condition – exp 5
left somatosensory cortex
Imaging actions ( own) ie self (4a)
left middle temporal gyrus
observing actions of others (1)
left inferior frontal gyrus
observing actions of others (1)
SMA
remember for future action (Decety) (2)

Middle frontal gyrus
remember for future action (Decety) (2)
parahippocampal gyrus in the temporal lobe
remember for future recognition (Decety) (2)
right superior temporal gyrus
intention ( human actions only -  not inanimate from exp comparing animate and inanimate) (3)
visual analysis of others actions (4)
left superior temporal gyrus
visual analysis of other’s actions in relation to actions performed by the self. (4)
cerebellum
Both means and goals condition – exp 5

intention determines pattern of neural activity

p493 ‘ these result support the notion of shared representations of self and other.  The results also suggest a crucial role of the inferior parietal cortex in distinguishing the perspective of self from other’ and the medial prefrontal for inferring the actions of others ie need to see the means of a task as well as the goals and this is consistent, including in terms of source location,  with the work on theory of mind

Theoretical speculation from combining developmental Psychology and Neurocience: from imitation to social cognition.

Theoretical speculation

Proposed : a three step developmental approach

(1)  Innate equipment.  Newborns can recognise equivalences between perceived and executed acts.  This is that a starting state
(2)  Constructing first person experience. Through everyday experience infants map the relation between their own bodily acts and their mental experiences. For example, there is an intimate relation between ‘striving to achieve a goal’ and the concomitant facial expression and effortful bodily acts.  Infants experience their own inner feelings and outward facial expressions and construct a detailed bidirectional map linking mental experience and behaviour.
(3)  Inferences about the experience of others. When infants see others acting ‘like me’ they project that others have the same mental experience that is mapped onto those behavioural states in the self.

Neuroscience -What is common and what is distinct between self and other at a neural level?

Temporal and frontal
There is neural activation in the posterior part of the temporal cortex and the medial prefrontal whatever the imitation task but must be human. Note medial prefrontal is also involved in mentalizing

Parietal
There is differential activity right versus left for inferior parietal lobe

left  p498 ‘ left inferior parietal lobe computes sensory-motor associations necessary to imitate ‘( consistent with lit. on apraxia)

right  self-other p498 ‘ is involved in recognising or detecting that actions performed by others are similar to those initiated by the self and detecting that actions performed by others are similar to those initiated by the self and determining the locus of agency for matching bodily acts’  implies that we have a body scheme and this idea is consistent with neuropsychological evidence ( disorders of bodily representation)

Summary
P498 ‘ in light of our neuroimaging experiments, we suggest that the right inferior parietal lobule plays a key role in the uniquely human capacity to identify with others and appreciate the subjective states of conspecifics as both similar and differentiated from one’s own.  ……in other words, the adult human framework is not simply one of resonance.  We are able to recognise that everyone does not share our own desires, emotions, intentions and beliefs.  To become a sophisticated mentaliser one needs to analyse both the similarities and differences between one’s own states and those of others.  That is what makes us human’.

Diana 2012 book: on imitation
 P 163 ‘Learning through practice is different because it goes beyond the realm of language and representation.  In terms of human evolution, learning through experience long predates learning through language. Learning through language and communication is, of course, a vastly more efficient way of passing on accumulated knowledge and skills , so the teaching professions from earliest times naturally made use of ‘teaching through telling’. Learning through practice in the form of learning through imitation has always been part of human, and indeed some animal , society; and learning through apprenticeship, where the imitation is accompanied by communication, is inevitably more efficient. When you learn flint-knapping and find you broke off too large a piece of slate, it saves time to have someone tell you to hit a different angle when you might have thought you were hitting too hard’
KRO learning through imitation is different from learning through practice ( which may mean learning through repeated association) or learning through doing when actions and consequences can be related one to the other i.e. embodied in some way.

Margie on Meltzoff, p148-149 (Chapter 7)
‘In Chapter  4 I noted Daniel Stern’s (2004, p. 76) claim that our nervous systems are designed to be ‘captured by the nervous systems of others’ as we observe their gestures, facial expressions, their rising and dampening affect and then model, intuit and re-run their intentions and psychological states.  In recent years, a much clearer sense has emerged of the design features involved, how affective inter-subjectivity becomes established in infancy, and then shaped and ‘personilised’ within the relational patterns and interactional routines of childhhood ( Fonagy et al, 2004)

based on Meltzoff  ‘ In other words, what seems to be present at birth is an embryonic capacity to represent one’s own body and the other’s body and coordinate the two together








Wednesday, 11 July 2012

grammar speaking writing


Grammar in context (OU)
Sees 'grammar as a tool for adapting our communications in ways which present us and our message in different lights and is dependent on may contextual factors'  ( KRO including whether f-f or online').  ' exploring grammar can allow you to see how language is intertwined with both describing a view of the world and interacting with others in it'

Grammar is different in speech and writing
lexis ( choice of vocabulary) combined with choice of grammar  lexico-grammar convey the meanings we make with language

Descriptive grammars
Different theories of language result in different types off grammatical description. Grammar  as choosing different forms to express different types of meaning rather  than as correct usage
   Structural (traditional) grammar as parts of speech eg noun, verb
   Functional grammar how words combine to give meaning - how we use grammar rather than its correctness
Prescriptive grammars
 - how we should write or speak(rather than how we DO speak) rules of sentence construction eg do not split infinitives

Contextual influences
Malonski grounded description of grammar in cultural, geographical, social and economic conditions. ' how variations in what we are doing, who we are communicating with, whether face-to-face or separated in time and space' .... affect our choice if grammar. Ie socio-cultural context rather than in the context of the immediate text.


Writing at at a distance
   Listener Cannot ask for 'immediate' clarification
   Speaker Rephrasing limited
   Listener no NVC indicators about understanding and emotions of the listener when we write we are likely to be observing the conventions of both contexts

Systematic variations between writing and speaking
Most significant is the amount of information per word used. ? Reflection of one as a very planned environment.
Speaking
   More informal
   Not so careful about choice of words
   No time to plan and revise to fit in with the meaning we want to convey
 'Most choices of language usage are unconscious  but nevertheless motivated'
Speaking face-face different to speaking online (KRO no evidence)

Speaking f-f  think in terms of utterances rather than sentences
No full stop

Utterances seem incomplete or they change direction

String of utterances linked by some key words e.g. and

When f-f we share an immediate physical context therefore  do not need to make everything explicit, can use question tags (would she?) which invite a response either verbally or by a nod of the head, i.e this practice also invites interactiveness

Missing out pronouns is common and probably adds to a feeling of closeness. Whereas in writing ' uses fuller combinations of nouns and adjectives to specify who or what is being referred to'

Vernacular range, contractions (i've) non standard usage, repetition and hesitation

Ellipsis
' occurs when some elements if a phrase or other unit of language are not specified because they can be inferred from the contexts'. Occur in both speaking and writing but more common in speech.

Dysfluency, -
pauses and hesitators
'analyses of large amounts of conversational data shows that there are systematic patterns in how they are used'
Hesitators - indicators that a speaker has not yet finished their turn for example the speaker needs some time for forward planning of what to say next or in the future
Pauses - speaker about to start a new part of their utterance , often followed by words such as OK
Repetitions, can function as either hesitators or pauses

Heads and tails
occur frequently in speaking, (based on computational analysis of databases of natural language in real life)
Heads - used a a signal that a new topic of conversation is being introduced so that the listener can prepare for what is coming next.
Tails - 'used as evaluative' contexts , to reinforce















dialect nettle, dunbar




Nettle, D., and Dunbar, R.I.M. (1997)
Social markers and the evolution of reciprocal exchange
Current Anthropology, 38, 1, 93 - 99

p 93 ' Most anthropologists take the human propensity to form groups based on cooperative exchange as a theoretical primitive.  Groups of this kind do seem to be an integral and fundamental part of human social structure'.  The question is why. Natural selection depends on genes and therefore the individual. Cooperative activity that involves the transmission of knowledge does have survival value - but what about reciprocation , how can  it be considered to be 'an evolutionary stable strategy' when you need to give things away. However cooperation is only viable ' when there is relatedness or guaranteed reciprocity between individuals'.

Kinship can secure cooperation,  for unrelated individuals there  has to be a high likelihood of 'meeting in the future ' ,Axelrod (1884) , therefore  continuity is essential for securing cooperative social relations. Suggestion from anthropological studies ' language serves an important index of social allegiances, and this indexing could well be important for the maintenance off group cohesion'.

p94 'why should so much of the surface form of language be acquired from the environment, and why should that environment have come to be so different the world over' Pinker and Bloom (1990) have addressed this question. First, they explain, to represent a complete language, including all the words, genetically might consume excessive genotypic space. Secondly, as the language faculty must be expected to change by genetic drift, an individual with an innate language might well fall out of step with his peers. It would thus be advantageous to have a code with developmental flexibility. To home in on that spoken in the group. Thirdly, as Hinton and Nowlan (1987) find, once most of a trait is determined genetically, selective pressure to represent the rest of the genotype declines, because learning can be relied upon to fill it. Divergence, it is argued, arises as an accidental consequence of the genetic under specification of language.

p 94 'Individuals do not just learn any language, they  " construct their system of verbal behaviour to resemble that common to the group or groups with which (they) wish from time to time to be identified "LePage 1968' p 192

  p 94/95 'Gaertner and Bickman (1971), Giles, Baker, and Fielding (1975), Feldman (1968) and Harris and Bardin ( 1972) have all shown in various contexts.... that use of a highly valued speech variety greatly increases success in obtaining cooperation from strangers' .... ' that access to cooperation depends of having the use of the right linguistic markers. This socio-indexical role may be a function of language of some evolutionary importance.......As Chambers (1995, 208,250) puts it " The fact that linguistic variability is universal and ubiquitous suggests strongly that is fulfilling some essential human need..... The underlying cause of sociolinguistics differences.....is the human instinct to establish and maintain social identity"

Simulation study
An organism's initial  position in an environment  is random and the probability of meeting another organism is   random but the further apart they are the less likely that they will meet. 
Each organism has a memory span and each simulation a set time.
Task - to accumulate wealth. Giving costs 1 unit but the receiver's wealth will increase by 2 units.  ' the asymmetry precisely mirrors the fitness consequences of exchange'

Four types of organisms. Each type has its own exchange statelegy
   COOPs always gives when it meets another, unless it can remember giving and not receiving in an encounter with that particular individual. ' It this follows a tit for tat strategy of the kind which is highly effective in organisms that can reliably recognise each other'
   CHEATS - free rider, never gives to anyone
   POLYGOTS - dialects come into play,. POLYGOTS gives gifts only if the recipient has a nearly identical dialect. When it receives a gift it changes it's dialect to that of its benefactor. In addition it may change one of the numbers that define its dialect probability of this occurring is it's CHANGERATE
   MIMICS. Also a free rider but changes it's dialect to be like that of a benefactor when it receives a gift.

Results
COOPS and CHEATS
A population  of all COPS does very well
 Introducing just 5 CHEATS is disastrous irrespective of how the other parameters are set - could only counteract by setting memory span at an unrealistic level

POLYGOTS and MIMICS
When all the organisms are POLYGOTS distinctive dialects emerge. Organisms in the same dialect group exchange and therefore keep standardising their dialects, whilst those in differ groups cease to exchange. As long as minimal levels for memory span and duration are met, CHEATS cannot invade although they dominate initially.

MIMICS a minimum of 5 (for this model) needed to invade and can displace the POLYGOTS. However if CHANGERATE of POLYGOTS is increased then MIMICS fail.

Discussion
The simulation is a simple system. Nevertheless ' it shows that cooperation can evolve more easily in a simple system where social marking is present than in one where it is not'
p 98 ' producing distinctive codes may be a way that reciprocal exchange in large groups can be made more stable'
In f-f other systems e.g. Clothing, and other artefacts could be adopted.
' our great skill in using and assessing language as a social marker is an adaptive psychological mechanism tied up with the very development of human exchange and communication'