Andrew N. Meltzoff and Jean Decety (2003)
What imitation tells us about social cognition: a reapproachment
between developmental psychology and cognitive neuroscience
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B , 358, 491-500
P491 ‘Through imitating others, the human young come to
understand that others not only share behavioural states, but are ‘like me’ in
deeper ways as well’.
P494 ‘Imitation seems to be intrinsically coupled with
empathy for others, broadly construed’
‘The holy grail for cognitive and neuroscience theories of
imitation is to elucidate the mechanism by which infants connect the felt but
unseen movement of the self with the seen but unfelt movement of the other’.
Developmental psychology approach and evidence
Imitation as innate?
Newborns imitate
P492 imitation is
‘part of innate endowment of humans’ imitation in the newborn has been shown in
14 independent labs. P493 ‘There is an innate link between the perception and
production of human acts’
12-21 day infants could imitate four gestures ‘ infants
confused neither actions nor body parts’ also p 492 ‘It is as if young infants
isolate what part of their body to move before how to move it’ ie there is
‘organ identification’
‘infants can store a model and imitate from memory …… which
requires more than a simple visual-motor resonance’
Self-other relations.
Awareness of self
Knowing you are being imitated requires being aware of self.
p494 ‘ The infancy work shows that young babies correct
their imitative behaviour which suggests active comparison between self and
other ( Meltzoff and Moore, 1997)
‘a listener often shows interpersonal connectedness with a
speaker by adopting the postural configuration of the speaker’
Can infants recognise when another acts ‘like me’?
What is the emotional value of the experience?
Exp:
C1. One adult imitated the baby
C2. Another adult imitated the previous baby ( therefore
each adult acted like a perfect baby)
Results: For C1 cf
C2. baby smiled more, looked at adult
for longer, directed testing behaviour at the adult.
Older infants and sharedness
p494-495 ‘ the relationship is being abstractly considered’ ….. ‘ the
abstract notion that the other is doing the same as me’
Goals and intentions
(KR0 sharing attention etc hinges on being able to determine
intention and hence why realness might be important)
P495 “ In the mature adult notion, persons have internal
mental states – such as beliefs, goals, and intentions – that predict and
explain human actions’
P493 humans do not simply resonate, however. Our goals affect
how we process stimuli in the world’ i.e. intention determines pattern of
neural representation
Exp:
C1: show infants an unsuccessful act – at 18 months ‘ can
infer the unseen goals implied by unsuccessful atempts’ ….. ‘ they choose to
imitate what we meant to do rather than what we mistakenly did do’
Human v. non human
This was repeated using a mechanical device that traced the
same spatio-temporal path ‘infants did not attribute goals or intentions in
this case’
P497 “ This developmental research shows that infants
distinguished between what the adult meant to do and what he actually did they
ascribed goals to human acts, indeed, they inferred the goal even when it was
not attained. The differentiation between behaviour versus goals and
intentions lies at the core of our mentalizing, and it underlies our moral
judgements’
Neuroscience approach and evidence
P 491 ‘monkeys do not imitate’ but they do have mirror
units. But whether mirror units are innately present or the result of associative learning is not
known ( as of 2003)
Kinds of questions to ask p 495 “ What is the neural basis
for distinguishing the self’s imitation of the other from the other’s imitation
of the self?’ – the situation in the physical world is the same – there are two
bodies in correspondence with one another.
Missing p491 ‘ how a neural mirror system begets theory of
mind’
Experiments and experimental manipulations
1. Observing the actions of others
2. Future action v future
recognition
·
Remembering for
future action
·
Remember for
future recognition
3. Animate v. inanimate
·
Observe real
person
·
Observe in animate
4. Self – other
4a. Imaging actions
·
Own
·
Others
4b doing actions
·
Imitate others
actions
·
See others imitate
own actions
5. Means and goals ( LEGO
block exp)
·
Goal achived
condition only
·
Means only
·
Whole action
·
& control
conditions
Ventral premotor
(Mirror
units monkeys)
STS
(Mirror
units monkeys)
premotor – somotropic
observing
actions of others (1)
remember
for future action (Decety work) (2)
left premotor
observe
an achieved goal (5)
parietal (right and left)
Observing
actions of others (1)
remember
for future action (Decety) (2)
left parietal
Imaging
actions ( own) ie self (4a)
intention
( human actions only - not inanimate
from exp comparing animate and inanimate) (3)
imitate
others actions (4b)
right parietal
imagining
others actions (4b)
see
others imitate own actions (4b)
posterior cingulated
imagining
others actions (4a)
fronto polar cortex
imagining
others actions (4a)
medial prefrontal cortex
imitate others actions (4b)
see
others imitate own actions (4b)
differentiated
means only from goal only condition of
Exp 5. nb from other research
areas plays a critical role in inferencing ie need to be able to observe the
means in order to make inferences.
Right dorso lateral prefrontal
Both
means and goals condition – exp 5
left somatosensory cortex
Imaging
actions ( own) ie self (4a)
left middle temporal gyrus
observing
actions of others (1)
left inferior frontal gyrus
observing
actions of others (1)
SMA
remember
for future action (Decety) (2)
Middle frontal gyrus
remember
for future action (Decety) (2)
parahippocampal gyrus in the
temporal lobe
remember
for future recognition (Decety) (2)
right superior temporal gyrus
intention
( human actions only - not inanimate
from exp comparing animate and inanimate) (3)
visual
analysis of others actions (4)
left superior temporal gyrus
visual
analysis of other’s actions in relation to actions performed by the self. (4)
cerebellum
Both
means and goals condition – exp 5
intention determines pattern
of neural activity
p493 ‘ these result support the notion of shared
representations of self and other. The
results also suggest a crucial role of the inferior parietal cortex in
distinguishing the perspective of self from other’ and the medial prefrontal
for inferring the actions of others ie need to see the means of a task as well
as the goals and this is consistent, including in terms of source
location, with the work on theory of
mind
Theoretical speculation from combining developmental
Psychology and Neurocience: from imitation to social cognition.
Theoretical
speculation
Proposed : a three
step developmental approach
(1) Innate
equipment. Newborns can recognise
equivalences between perceived and executed acts. This is that a starting state
(2) Constructing
first person experience. Through everyday experience infants map the
relation between their own bodily acts and their mental experiences. For
example, there is an intimate relation between ‘striving to achieve a goal’ and
the concomitant facial expression and effortful bodily acts. Infants experience their own inner feelings
and outward facial expressions and construct a detailed bidirectional map
linking mental experience and behaviour.
(3) Inferences
about the experience of others. When infants see others acting ‘like me’
they project that others have the same mental experience that is mapped onto
those behavioural states in the self.
Neuroscience -What is
common and what is distinct between self and other at a neural level?
Temporal and frontal
There is neural activation in the posterior part of the
temporal cortex and the medial prefrontal whatever the imitation task but must
be human. Note medial prefrontal is also
involved in mentalizing
Parietal
There is differential activity right versus left for
inferior parietal lobe
left p498 ‘ left
inferior parietal lobe computes sensory-motor associations necessary to imitate
‘( consistent with lit. on apraxia)
right self-other p498
‘ is involved in recognising or detecting that actions performed by others are
similar to those initiated by the self and detecting that actions performed by
others are similar to those initiated by the self and determining the locus of
agency for matching bodily acts’ implies
that we have a body scheme and this idea is consistent with neuropsychological
evidence ( disorders of bodily representation)
Summary
P498 ‘ in light of our neuroimaging experiments, we suggest
that the right inferior parietal lobule plays a key role in the uniquely human
capacity to identify with others and appreciate the subjective states of
conspecifics as both similar and differentiated from one’s own. ……in other words, the adult human framework
is not simply one of resonance. We are
able to recognise that everyone does not share our own desires, emotions,
intentions and beliefs. To become a
sophisticated mentaliser one needs to analyse both the similarities and
differences between one’s own states and those of others. That is what makes us human’.
Diana 2012 book: on
imitation
P 163 ‘Learning
through practice is different because it goes beyond the realm of language and
representation. In terms of human
evolution, learning through experience long predates learning through language.
Learning through language and communication is, of course, a vastly more
efficient way of passing on accumulated knowledge and skills , so the teaching
professions from earliest times naturally made use of ‘teaching through
telling’. Learning through practice in the form of learning through imitation
has always been part of human, and indeed some animal , society; and learning
through apprenticeship, where the imitation is accompanied by communication, is
inevitably more efficient. When you learn flint-knapping and find you broke off
too large a piece of slate, it saves time to have someone tell you to hit a
different angle when you might have thought you were hitting too hard’
KRO learning through imitation is different from learning
through practice ( which may mean learning through repeated association) or
learning through doing when actions and consequences can be related one to the
other i.e. embodied in some way.
Margie on Meltzoff,
p148-149 (Chapter 7)
‘In Chapter 4 I noted
Daniel Stern’s (2004, p. 76) claim that our nervous systems are designed to be
‘captured by the nervous systems of others’ as we observe their gestures,
facial expressions, their rising and dampening affect and then model, intuit
and re-run their intentions and psychological states. In recent years, a much clearer sense has
emerged of the design features involved, how affective inter-subjectivity
becomes established in infancy, and then shaped and ‘personilised’ within the
relational patterns and interactional routines of childhhood ( Fonagy et al,
2004)
based on Meltzoff ‘
In other words, what seems to be present at birth is an embryonic capacity to
represent one’s own body and the other’s body and coordinate the two together
