Oberman et al mu rhythm ASD mirror units

Oberman, L.M., Hubbard, E.M., McCleery, J.P., Altschuler, E.L., Ramachandran, V.S., & Pineda, J.A. (2005).

EEG evidence for mirror neuron dysfunction in autism spectrum disorders

Cognitive Brain Research 24, 190-198

Review of the evidence for mirror units in humans

Can’t be studied ( KRO therefore identified and substantiated) directly in humans

P191 ‘the existence of an analogous system ( KRO to that of monkeys) in the homologous brain region ( Broca’s area, Brodmann’s area 44) has been supported by indirect population-level measures

• Ref 17 (1995)Fadiga et al using TMS ‘motor evoked potentials in response to TMS over motor cortex were enhanced when the subject observed another individual performing an action relative to when the subject detected the dimming of a light.
• Ref 39 (1995)Parsons et al used PET to map the brain areas that were active during observation of biological movement. Frontal, parietal and cerebellar regions, including the inferior premotor cortex ( Brodmann’s area 44 – Kro thought to be equivalent to F5 of monkeys) were found to be active during actual movement, imagined movement and observed movement.
• Ref 29 Iacoboni et al (1999)using FMRI found increased blood flow in Brodmann’s area 44 during both observed and performed actions. Ref 10,36 (more recent refs) seem to confirm that these areas are implicated

Also ‘Several recent studies have uncovered activations with similar properties in the parietal cortex ( 10.39) as well as superior temporal sulcus (11,40). These results suggest that the frontal mirror unit system may be one part of a broader action observation/execution network (18.38).’

Monitoring mu rhythm as an indirect method of investigating mirror units in humans

P191 claim ‘ at rest sensorimotor neurons spontaneously fire in synchrony leading to large amplitude EEG oscillations in the 8-13 frequency band. When subjects perform an action, these units fire asynchronously, thereby decreasing the power of the mu-band EEG oscillations ( 41,48). Because the motor properties of the mirror neurons are indistinguishable from those of neighbouring premotor, motor or sensorimotor neurons, mu wave suppression during self-performed actions is likely to be the a

result of activation of several neuronal systems …….During observed hand movement , however, the mirror neuron system is the only network that has been identified to be active in this area of the cortex. ( KRO assumption, speculation?)

Mu power recorded from electrodes on scalp locations C3, Cz & C4 is reduced in normal adults by self initiated movement and observed movements (5,14,26,42)

Rationale for this research

Calls on evidence that ‘human mirror neuron system has been implicated in a variety of higher-level cognitive processes …imitation, language, theory of mind and empathy (refs 54 & 46) all of which are characteristic of ASD.

P191 ‘ once another individuals actions are represented and understood in terms of one’s own actions, it is possible to predict the mental state of the observed individual, leading to theory of mind deficits’ ‘ Empathy may critically depend on one’s ability to understand the observed facial expressions in terms of one’s own motor representations’ ( KRO but first time that the paper mentions facial expression as part of imitative movement)

Research methodogy

ASDs & controls NOTE age range 6-47 did correlation against age , reported as no correlation rather than reporting individual r values ( calculated r across three conditions and three targeted electrode placements and two participant groups ie across nine values of r for each participant group). Also don’t know the distribution of ages in the two groups. All male.

4 conditions – (i) moving own hand, (ii) watching a video of a moving hand, (iii) watching a video of two bouncing balls ( non –biological motion) (iv) watching white visual noise (baseline). (KRO absence of noise and other wild features)

Counting task , number of times the movement stopped, to control for attentional aspects.

EEG

Mastoid refes. F3, Fz,F4,C3,Cz,C4,P3,Pz,P4,T5,T6,O1,& O2 using a cap. But used recordings from C3,Cz & C4 claiming that p194 ‘although data were obtained from electrodes across the scalp, mu rhythmn is defined as oscillations measured over sensorimotor cortex thus only data from C3, Cz and C4 presented’

Data collected for 170 seconds per condition at a sampling rate of 500 HZ. Recognised that recodings at C3,Cz & C4 might be affected by changes in awareness ( KRO therefore alpha) and therefore first 10 s of each block were removed to eliminate the possibility of attentional transients. Also claims that since eyes were open throughout then any alpha rhythm would be at attenuated. EOG used to monitor artefact (eye & head only) and used to remove artefact from records. Integrated power measurement in 8-13 Hz range. P193 ‘data were segmented into epochs of 2 seconds beginning at the start of the segment, FFT were performed on the epoched data (1024 points). A cosine window was used to control for artefacts resulting from data splicing’

2 measures of mu suppression

(1i) power ratio observed hand movement /baseline

(1ii) power ratio self hand movement/baseline

(2i) power ratio observed hand movement /ball movement

(2ii) power ratio self hand movement/ball movement

1 controls for individual differences

2 controls for counting

Based comparison between two groups on log ratios with less than zero indicating suppression and more than zero indicating enhancement.

Results

Based on recordings at C3, CZ, C4 p195 ‘ there was a lack of suppression in the ASD group during the observed hand movement condition suggestive of a dysfunction in the mirror neuron system’ ‘ Furthermore the lack of suppression during the observation conditions in the ASD group is contrasted with significant suppression to their own movement., which is indicative of normal functioning of other sensorimotor systems involved in self-performed actions. P194 ‘No other electrodes showed a consistent pattern of suppression in the frequency band of interest’ (KRO but why was this data not presented as it would be useful to see.)

Discussion

Was the counting task a confounding factor? ( differential effect on the ASD subjects) Didn’t have to count in the baseline condition but did in the bat and ball so that explanation seems unlikely.

Supporting evidence from other work

P195 based on ref 37 ‘ averaging MEG to the presentations of a woman performing orofacial gestures and instructed to imitate. Activations in inferior temporal lobe and primary motor cortex were weaker and had greater latency in the AS group when compared with the control group’

Authors recognise the potential for a low level explanation ‘ p196 ‘ the impaired visual processing of biological motion. This would result in reduced activation in visual areas thought to be involved in biological motion perception’

Differences could be due to inhibitory influences from other brain processes and therefore brain regions.

Further work: looking at metaphorical statements of movement egg rap the idea, reach for the stars.

Brass Heyes imitation - theoretical frameworks & neuroscience

Marcel Brass and Cecilia Heyes (2005)

Imitation: is cognitive neuroscience solving the correspondence problem?

Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9, 10, 489-495

Authors see imitation as copying body movement although at the same time claims that p489 ‘imitation provides a foundation for language acquisition, skill learning, socialization, and enculturation’

P493

More than a century of research on imitation has left us with a crucial functional problem: how are we able to transform a visual representation of an action into motor output. In the present review we have considered whether recent work in cognitive neuroscience has helped us to

solve this correspondence problem.

The correspondence problem: How does the imitator know what pattern of motor activation will make their action look like that of the model? P489 ‘ when we observe another person moving we do not see the muscle activation underlying their movement but rather the external consequences of that activation. So, how does the observer’s motor system ‘know’ which muscle activations will lead to the observed movement;’

Specialist theories – there are functional ( ? modules) and neurological mechanisms dedicated to controlling imitation.

eg of a specialist theory AIM (active intermodal matching)

P 490 ‘coding allows a visual representation of an observed action to be matched up with a pattern of motor activation that can produce the same action.’

Generalist theories – problem solved by general mechanisms of associative learning and action control. Neuroscience support – imitation is based on the automatic activation of motor representations by movement observation. ie motor representations depend on learned perceptual-motor links and are externally triggered.

eg IM (ideomotor theory) and ASL( associative sequence learning model– p490 ‘subsumes imitation under a general account of motor control and the associative sequence learning model (ASL)….. all actions are represented in the form of ‘images’ of sensory feedback….observing someone else executing an action leads to an activation of an internal motor representation in the observer because the observed action is similar to the content of the equivalent motor representation…… ASL complements IM by explaining imitation, not only of ‘transparent’ actions such as finger movements, but also ‘opaque’ actions such as facial expressions, where the observer’s image of the model is not normally similar to the sensory feedback received during performance of the same action ASL does this by postulating that each action guiding image is a compound of two action representations –one encoding visual information (what the action looks like), and the other containing somatosensory information and motor commands (what the action feels like and how it is initiated). The visual and motor components become linked through Hebbian learning. Like IM, ASL assumes that learning of this kind can occur whenever we look down and watch our own actions. However, it points out that self-observation of an opaque movement will normally give rise to a ‘nonmatching vertical association’, i.e. to a visuo-motor link that cannot support imitation because the visual component is not similar to the visual input received during observation of another person performing the same action. Performance of an opaque movement leads to the establishment of a ‘matching vertical association’, a visuo-motor link that can support imitation, only in the kinds of environment created by optical mirrors, imitative social partners and explicit training regimes.’

Evidence

Behavioral: RT of the copy of observed movements.(nb paradigm of congruent & incongruent movements, see Bird et al compatible, incompatible actions note Interference effects of this kind occur both when kinematic aspects of the movement are observed [17–19],

and when the terminal posture is presented alone 15.20)

Neuroimaging studies: participants need not be required to perform any action at all. P491 ‘Therefore, these studies provide yet clearer evidence that passive observation of action is sufficient to generate motor activation (see [21,22] for reviews). A large number of studies have now demonstrated that passive observation of action leads to activation of a set of brain regions known to be involved in movement execution [23–27] (see Box 2). Interestingly, although motor activation also occurs during observation of abstract stimuli, it seems to be strongest for the observation of human biological motion . Areas like the inferior parietal cortex seem to be strongly ‘tuned’ (innately or through learning) to biological motion, whereas frontal regions like Broca’s area seem to be concerned with more abstract aspects of the action like the goal [25,66,67]. This latter point is further supported by a recent demonstration that premotor areas involved in the processing of biological motion are also activated by sequences of abstract stimuli [68].’

P491 Imitation is typically effector-specific; to support this imaging studies suggest somatotopic organization for observed movements in motor-related areas [29–31], particularly in premotor cortex.

If we assume that special purpose mechanisms tend to be implemented in distinctive cortical areas, the failure to find ‘hot spots’ that are active during imitation ( KRO the assumption that it has to be a specific anatomical area) but not during passive movement observation is supportive of generalist solutions to the correspondence problem.

The role of learning in imitation and observation of biological motion.

ASL model, suggests that imitative performance can be either direct or linguistically mediated.

Another study relevant to learning found stronger automatic imitation effects when body movements were viewed from an ‘own person’ perspective (at the angle from which one views ones own movements) than from an ‘other person’ perspective [36]. This finding was recently confirmed with transcranial magnetic stimulation [37]. This is what one would expect if, as generalist theories suggest, imitation depends on experience of ones own actions’

‘The results of two neuroimaging studies indicate that activation of cortical areas involved in imitation and movement observation depends on learned expertise in performing the observed movements. Using an elegant experimental design, Calvo-Merino and colleagues [38] presented capoeira dancers, expert classical ballet dancers and non-dancer control participants with video-clips of closely matched capoeira and ballet movements (Figure 3).

The capoeira experts showed stronger activation in the premotor, parietal and posterior STS regions when observing capoeira movements than when observing ballet movements, and the ballet experts showed stronger activation in the same areas when observing ballet movements than when observing capoeira movements.’

P493

Problem for generalist theories : ‘If imitation depends on shared representations of perception and action, how can we distinguish between internally generated and externally triggered motor representation’ also why don’t we imitate all of the time?

Is there an inhibition process . Brass and colleagues [44,45] investigated the functional and neuronal mechanismsinvolved in inhibition of imitative response tendencies. These studies showed that the inhibition of imitative behaviour involves cortical areas which are known to be involved in distinguishing self from other, rather than response inhibition per se. These findings provide support for the view that action observation activates motor representations of the same kind that guide internally-generated action. If they did not, it would be unnecessary for inhibition of imitation to call on mechanisms that distinguish self and other [45]. Also ‘Research involving neurological patients indicates that this problem is not purely theoretical. Some patients withprefrontal lesions are echopractic; they tend to imitate observed behaviour, rather than to follow verbal or symbolic instructions [41]. Sometimes this even leads to compulsive ‘imitation behaviour’ [42,43].’

Mirror units

Mirror Units

From Brass & Heyes (2005)

P489

‘Mirror neurons in the premotor area F5 of monkeys are active both when the animal observes and when it executes a specific action (for a review see [52,53]. The discovery of these cells has had a revolutionary impact, turning perception–action interaction into a focus of intensive, interdisciplinary research worldwide. Naturally there has been a great deal of speculation about the function of mirror neurons, including proposals that they mediate, not only imitation, but also action understanding, empathy, language development [54,55], and action simulation [56]. However, at present, direct experimental evidence for the involvement of mirror neurons

in one or all these functions is relatively weak.

Progress in research on the function of mirror neurons might have been hampered by a failure to distinguish clearly between two questions: What do they do?, What are they for? Imitation might well be one of the things that mirror neurons do; under some conditions, in some species, mirror neurons could be involved in the generation of imitative behaviour. However, mirror neurons could do imitation without being for imitation; they could be involved in generating imitative behaviour without imitation being the function that favoured their evolution by natural selection. In other words, imitation and other functions of mirror neurons could be exaptations rather than adaptations(57).’ Ie generalist theories would say that mirror neurons may do imitation but that they are not for imitation. ‘the properties of mirror neurons are not innate, and the learning and action-control processes that lead to their formation evolved in response to much more general adaptive problems.’ No empirical evidence as to whether mirror units are present at birth.’

Note claims that monkeys do not imitate evidence that is supportive of generalist theories.

Bird et al UCL imitation (voluntary v automatic) Autism

Geoffrey Bird*, Jane Leighton, Clare Press and Cecilia Heyes (2007)

Department of Psychology UCL

Intact automatic imitation of human and robot actions in autism spectrum disorders

Proc. R. Soc. B, 274, 3027-3031

Abstract

The existence of a specialized imitation module in humans is hotly debated. Studies suggesting a specific imitation impairment in individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) support a modular view. However, the voluntary imitation tasks used in these studies (which require socio-cognitive abilities in addition to imitation for successful performance) cannot support claims of a specific impairment. Accordingly, an automatic imitation paradigm (a ‘cleaner’ measure of imitative ability) was used to assess the imitative ability of 16 adults with ASD and 16 non-autistic matched control participants. Participants performed a prespecified hand action in response to observed hand actions performed either by a human or a robotic hand. On compatible trials the stimulus and response actions matched, while on incompatible trials the two actions did not match. Replicating previous findings, the Control group showed an automatic imitation effect: responses on compatible trials were faster than those on incompatible trials. This effect was greater when responses were made to human than to robotic actions (‘animacy bias’). The ASD group also showed an automatic imitation effect and a larger animacy bias than the Control group. We discuss these findings with reference to the literature on imitation in ASD and theories of imitation.

Keywords: imitation; autism; mirror neuron; mirror system; animacy

P3027 (Introduction)

Theories that address imitation fall into two categories: specialist and generalist theories (Brass & Heyes 2005). Specialist theories propose that imitation is mediated by a

special-purpose imitation module, whereas generalist theories suggest that it is mediated by task-general learning and motor control mechanisms. It has been known for some

time that children and adults with ASD perform poorly in a variety of imitation tasks (see Williams et al. (2004) for a review).However, it is not clear whether their weak imitative

performance is due to specific or non-specific factors. Abnormal performance in imitation tasks could be due to either impairment of the mechanisms that translate observed into executed actions (specific factors) or impairment of mechanisms that are recruited by both the imitative and the non-imitative tasks (non-specific factors).

Most of the imitation tasks used in the studies of ASD make substantial demands on non specific mechanisms because they assess intentional or ‘voluntary’ imitation. In tests of voluntary imitation, the experimenter asks the participant to copy an action that has many temporal and spatial features, and does not specify exactly which features of the action are to be reproduced. For example, Rogers et al. (2003) instructed participants simply to ‘do

this’. Determining the appropriate action dimensions for imitation, and therefore what constitutes successful performance, is accomplished through the interpretation

of subtle cues relating to the social context and the experimenter’s mental states. The ability to focus on the selected action dimensions, so that performance is not impaired by imitation of task-irrelevant action dimensions, relies on good executive function and attentional

control. Interpretation of social cues, theory of mind, executive functions and attentional control have all been shown to be impaired in autism (Russell 1997; Bird et al.

2006; Frith & Frith 2006). Therefore, they are all candidate non-specific mechanisms that could account for poor performance on voluntary imitation tasks.

Neurological evidence in support of the specific factors hypothesis has come from studies suggesting that ASD are characterized by dysfunction of the mirror system (e.g.

Dapretto et al. 2006; Williams et al. 2006). The mirror system, comprising bilateral inferior frontal gyrus and parietal cortex, active when actions are both executed and

observed, is maximally activated during imitation (Iacoboni et al. 1999). This characteristic makes it plausible that the mirror system translates observed into executed actions, and is consistent with evidence that lesions to the mirror system result in poor performance on

imitation tasks (Heilman et al. 1982). Therefore, reports of abnormal mirror system activity in individuals with ASD support the view that their difficulties in imitation tasks are due, at least in part, to specific factors.

However different studies have localized the mirror system deficit in ASD to different neurological areas.

P3028 (Discussion)

The present study assessed imitation in high-functioning adults with ASD using an automatic imitation procedure. We chose an automatic, rather than a voluntary, imitation

test in order to minimize the demands that it would make on non-specific mechanisms. In tests of automatic imitation, participants are not asked, and do not intend,

to imitate modelled movements. Instead, they are required merely to observe actions, either passively or with a simple movement task, while the experimenter measures involuntary

muscular responses (passive observation tasks) or involuntary differences in speed to execute prespecified actions (simple movement tasks). As far as we are aware, only one previous study has tried to investigate automatic imitation in ASD. McIntosh et al.

(2006) used electromyography (EMG) to measure muscular activity in the face while participants were presented with emotional facial expressions. Compared with controls, individuals with ASD showed less expression-compatible muscular activation. However,

this study did not distinguish automatic imitation from emotional contagion. It is not clear whether, in the controls, observation of a smiling face promoted smiling directly, or by inducing positive affect. The results are also difficult to interpret because face stimuli were presented, and there is a growing body of evidence that gaze patterns to faces are abnormal in autism (Klin et al. 2002). Specifically, individuals with ASD spend less time looking

at the eye region of the face, which has been shown to be crucial in emotion recognition (Spezio et al. 2007). To overcome these problems, we used affectively neutral hand movements in our automatic imitation task.

The present study assessed imitation in high-functioning adults with ASD using an automatic imitation procedure. We chose an automatic, rather than a voluntary, imitation test in order to minimize the demands that it would make on non-specific mechanisms. In tests of automatic

imitation, participants are not asked, and do not intend, to imitate modelled movements. Instead, they are required merely to observe actions, either passively or with a simple

movement task, while the experimenter measures involuntary muscular responses (passive observation tasks) or involuntary differences in speed to execute prespecified

actions (simple movement tasks). As far as we are aware, only one previous study has tried

to investigate automatic imitation in ASD. McIntosh et al. (2006) used electromyography (EMG) to measure muscular activity in the face while participants were presented with emotional facial expressions. Compared with controls, individuals with ASD showed less

expression-compatible muscular activation. However, this study did not distinguish automatic imitation from emotional contagion. It is not clear whether, in the controls, observation of a smiling face promoted smiling directly, or by inducing positive affect. The results are also

difficult to interpret because face stimuli were presented, and there is a growing body of evidence that gaze patterns to faces are abnormal in autism (Klin et al. 2002). Specifically, individuals with ASD spend less time looking at the eye region of the face, which has been shown to be crucial in emotion recognition (Spezio et al. 2007). To overcome these problems, we used affectively neutral hand movements in our automatic imitation task. imitation effect is greater when the observed action is performed by a human effector than when it is performed

by a human-like mechanical device, or ‘robot’ (Kilner et al. 2003; Press et al. 2005). It has been argued that the latter effect is a direct consequence of increased mirror system activity in response to observation of human, compared with robotic, action (Tai et al. 2004). Thus, this study sought to investigate automatic imitation and the animacy effect in both a group of high-functioning adults with ASD and typically developing matched controls.

For both open and close responses, response onset was measured by recording the electromyogram (EMG) from the first dorsal interosseous muscle

P3030

This study tested automatic imitation of affectively neutral hand actions in ASD. In comparison with matched, typically developing controls, the ASD group showed an

equivalent automatic imitation effect, and signs of an increased animacy bias, namely, a greater difference in automatic imitation of human and robot actions.

The principal finding of the present study was that individuals with ASD did not show an impairment of automatic imitation of affectively neutral hand actions. This finding contrasts with reports of an imitation impairment in this group (Williams et al. 2004), but it is

not wholly anomalous with respect to studies of imitation in ASD. Several studies have found imitative performance to be unimpaired (e.g. Carpenter et al. 2001; Hamilton

et al. 2007; see also Sebanz et al. 2005) and, as noted in §1, performance in tests of voluntary imitation is vulnerable to the effects of non-specific factors such as theory of mind

and executive function impairments. Therefore, whether or not a particular voluntary imitation task presents a challenge to individuals with ASD may depend upon the interaction between two factors: the extent to which the task requires non-specific abilities and the degree to which these abilities are impaired in the particular sample of individuals recruited for the study.

Brass et al. 2003). The authors of these studies argue that distinguishing the self from

others, which relies on the theory of mind system, is a crucial component of imitation inhibition. Theories of mind deficits are well documented in ASD (for a review

see Frith & Frith 2003). Therefore, this hypothesis suggests that the ASD group showed a greater compatibility effect because they had problems inhibiting imitation of human actions. Such a suggestion is consonant with two clinical features of autism which indicate problems with imitation inhibition: echolalia (involuntary imitation of the speech patterns of others)

and echopraxia (involuntary imitation of observed actions; Russell 1997).

Bordia 1997 review (business, sociological, psychological)

Prashant Bordia (1997)

Face-to-Face Versus Computer-Mediated Communication: A Synthesis of the Experimental Literature.

Journal of Business Communication, 34,1,99-118.

Review, mostly experimental studies- business, sociological psychological ( up to 1997).

Some limitations merely technical

CMC - Reduced normative social pressure, more equal participation ( compounded by experience whether face to face or CMC), greater tendency to put forward decision preferences, more ideas generation BUT preference for Face to face when it comes to resolving disagreement.

Reviewed 18 experimental studies of CMC from business, sociological & psychological databases. Most of the studies used student samples with varying degrees of experience in CMC. Also, the studies differ on the nature of the task, the time allotted to complete the task, the degree of anonymity, and group member proximity in the CMC condition.

Proposition 1: CMC groups take longer to complete the allotted task.

Yes but 40% due to typing.

Proposition 2: In a given time period CMC groups produce fewer remarks than FTF groups.

7/18 studies looked at this variable, 5 found in the affirmative.

CMC groups have about equal or more task-oriented remarks and decision proposals (Dubrovsky et al., 1991; Siegel et al., 1986). Weisband (1992) reported more implicit decision preferences, explicit decision proposals, social pressure remarks, process remarks, and task irrelevant remarks in the CMC condition. According to McGuire et al. (1987), there were about the same number of remarks advocating a position in the CMC and the FTF groups. Thus, in terms of exchanging task related comments, CMC and FTF groups are not too different. The difference seems to be in the social-emotional exchange. FTF groups have more tension release and agreement statements, while CMC groups have a tendency of giving more suggestions, orientation, opinions (Hiltz et al., 1986), formal expressions, and fewer spontaneous questions (Kiesler, Zubrow, & Moses, 1985).

Proposition 3 CMC groups perform better than FTF groups on idea generation tasks.

Gallupe, Dennis, Cooper, Valacich, Bastianutti, and Nunamaker (1992) observed that, as group size increased, productivity per person decreased in FTF groups but stayed the same in CMC groups.

The major advantage of CMC groups lies in reduced production blocking and evaluation apprehension (Gallupe, Cooper, Grise, & Bastianutti, 1994). Gallupe et al. (1994) effectively demonstrated that, when production blocking is introduced in the CMC condition (freezing the keyboard, introducing "turn taking" and "first in" procedures),

performance decreased dramatically.

Proposition 4: There is greater equality of participation in CMC groups.

Equality of participation in the CMC condition is a fairly consistent finding. In addition, in CMC groups, the difference between high and low status member participation is less (Dubrovsky et al., 1991) and they are less likely to have one individual dominating

the discussion (Hiitz et al., 1986).

Interestingly, Adrianson and Hjelmquist (1991) found no difference in participation between the CMC groups and FTF groups, but they noted a strong effect of experience. Experienced subjects participated more equally in the two conditions

Proposition 5: When time is limited, CMC groups perform better than FTF groups on tasks involving less, and worse on tasks requiring more, social-emotional interaction. Given enough time, CMC groups perform as well as FTF groups.

Strong evidence supports the idea that, when a task involves less social-emotional interaction (such as idea generation), CMC groups perform better than FTF groups. For example, studies of group brainstorming reveal that CMC groups produce more nonredundant ideas than FTF groups (Gallupe et al., 1991). However, because of less

social-emotional interaction in CMC, these groups do not perform as well as FTF groups in tasks that require more social-emotional conversation (Kiesler et al, 1985) or increased interdependence (Straus& McGrath, 1994).

Proposition 6: There is reduced normative social pressure in CMC groups.

Several indirect and direct findings in this literature seem to indicate that there is less normative interpersonal or social pressure in CMC groups. First, CMC groups take longer to reach consensus (Dubrovsky et al., 1991; McGuire et al., 1987; Weisband, 1992). Second, there is greater opinion change and conformity to group decision

in FTF groups (Adrianson & Hjelmquist, 1991), and less agreement in CMC groups (Hiltz et al., 1986). These findings indirectly suggest reduced normative pressure in CMC groups.

Proposition 7: Perception (understanding) of partner and task is poorer in CMC groups.

Most studies affirm this proposition

Researchers have also reported on how the group member, who finally records the group's choice or decision, makes more errors in the CMC condition than in the FTF condition.

Proposition 8: In CMC, evaluation of the communication partner is poorer under conditions of limited time. Evaluation of the medium is influenced by the type of the task.

Some research studies affirm, some don’t. Also there are consequences that depend on this proposition.

Straus and McGarth (1994) noted that, as tasks needed more interdependence, the difference in satisfaction with the medium increased (lower satisfaction expressed for CMC).

the function "giving or receiving orders" produced no difference for medium (both media equally good); whereas, "resolving disagreements" had the maximum

difference (FTF medium preferred).

type of task seems to decide which medium is favored. In the case of idea-generation (brainstorming) tasks for example, the CMC condition was favored. Subjects in the FTF condition rated the task as more difficult, were less comfortable with the process, believed

they had participated less, and were more apprehensive than were subjects in the CMC condition (Gallupe et al., 1991).

Proposition 9a: There is higher incidence of uninhibited behavior in CMC groups.

Some studies yes some no.

Proposition 9b: CMC induces a state of deindividuation, which in turn leads to uninhibited behavior.

In the literature on CMC there is some confusion over the effects of deindividuation. Further research needs to be done to resolve identity and self-awareness issues in CMC.

Proposition 10: CMC groups, as compared to FTF groups, exhibit less choice shift or attitude change.

Findings comparing choice shift or attitude change in CMC and FTF groups are contradictory.

Refs to follow up?

Hiltz, S. R., Johnson, K., & Turoff, M. (1986). Experiments in group decision making:

communication process and outcome in face-to-face versus computerized

conferences. Human Communication Research, 13, 225-252.

Hiltz, S. R., Turoff, M., & Johnson, K. (1989). Experiments in group decision making,

3: Disinhibition, deindividuation. and group process in pen name and real

name computer conferences. Decision Support Systems, 5, 217-232.

Murphy - stages of collaboration

Elizabeth Murphy (2004)

Recognising and promoting collaboration in an online asynchronous discussion

British Journal of Educational Technology, 35,4,421-431

Definitions: collaboration (purposive sharing)

Frameworks – conceptual framework for collaboration: interaction, articiculating individual perspectives, accommodating and reflecting on individual perspectives, developing & building shared goals and purposes, producing shared artefacts.

Method Instrument for measuring content based on this framework ie subcodes for each stage

Findings: most did not show any evidence of accommodating to the perspectives of others.

Conclusion: ‘higher level processes of collaboration need to be more explicitly and effectively promoted.

Collaboration

P421 ‘ Collaboration is more than interaction and requires ’coordinated, synchronous activity that is the result of a continued attempt to construct and maintain a shared conception of a problem’ (Roschelle and Teasley, 1995,970). Collaboration represents a ‘purposive relationship’ the intent of which is ‘to produce something to solve a problem, create or discover something’ (Schrage, 1995,29) and to work together to achieve shared goals (Kaye 1992: Rochelle and Tealey, 1995).

(KRO responsible for the emboldened)

p422 ‘ in order for interaction to lead to collaboration in a context of online learning, specific measures must be taken to actively and consciously promote collaboration’

In order to promote collaboration the following are necessary

Understanding of the concept

Understanding how it manifests online

Identification & measurement

Supports and scaffolds that move discussants beyond interaction to collaboration.

Paper is about an identification & measurement instrument. The instrument is based on, p422, ‘ the development of a model which conceptualises collaboration on a continuum of processes that move from social presence to production of an artefact’ This concept gave a preliminary version of the instrument that covered six processes. After application the instrument was further developed to provided indicators for each process.

Conceptual framework for collaboration ( six stage process)

1. Interaction – p 422 ‘ participants show awareness of each other’s presence and begin to relate as a group’ key element is social presence which creates cohesion which feeds back into more interaction.

2. Articulating individual perspectives – p422 participants ‘do not explicitly reference the perspectives of others or solicit feedback from them’ ‘postings at this stage may read like a series of monologues (Henri, 1995)’.

3. Accommodating and reflecting on the perspectives of others

4. Co-constructing shared meaning p423 ‘ as participants articulate and externalise their perspectives, areas of disagreement or conflict become explicit. When individuals’ perspectives are challenged , they must work together to produce shared meaning ( O’Malley, 1995).

5. Developing & building shared goals and purposes

6 Producing shared artefacts

Producing shared artefacts note p423 the author argues that ‘ until this something new has been envisioned and created, collaboration is not complete’ ( KRO is this statement due to the influence of the fostering creativity researchers)..

The author argues that the earlier stage processes are prerequisites for the achievement of shared purpose and goal, but that ‘ participation at the lower levels does not guarantee that higher levels will be automatically reached’

Method

Based on group of eleven ( KRO is this two many, to what extent does collaboration depend on the group and its structure?) practioners ( pre-service teachers of French as a second language) over 4 weeks. Course module involved a three-step approach to collaborative problem solving consult, gather, produce. After each stage individuals are asked to compare individual and joint perspectives. 103 messages.

Instrument & Indicators on page 426-427

Results

P428 ‘ the process/indicator which occurred most often was ‘ articulating individual perspectives: statement of personal opinion or beliefs making no reference to perspectives of others (IO)’ 69/103 messages. Most did not show any evidence of accommodating to the perspectives of others.

Although students did get to the stage of questioning others perspectives P429 ‘ there were only two instances in which a participant directly responded to a question raised by another participant’ i.e. only two instances that meaning was being co-constructed… Only one instance of the fifth process , building a shared solution.

Similarity between these findings and other work

P 429 ‘ findings similar to the conclusion reached by Murphy and Laferriere (2001) in their analysis of two online asynchronous discussion forums using the TORI model of group development. In that study, the groups were moved through three stages

1. Trust formation & Open communication
2. Realisation of goals
3. Interinfluence.

In neither study did participants reach the third stage. ie the individual perspective prevailed.

Conclusion

P430 ‘ the higher level processes of collaboration need to be more explicitly and effectively promoted’

Tolmie, disgreement

Andrew Tolmie

CEN Methods seminar 3

Link this with So's paper on optional CMC

contingency detection ( explicit v implicit knowledge)

how important is disagreement? social allows disagreement to happen productively, asks how important is competition in dialogue?