Susan Jones (2005)
The role of mirror neurons in imitation
A commentary on V.Gallese
“Being like me: Self-other identity, mirror units and empathy
In Hurley, S & Chater, N (2005) Perspectives on Imitation: From neuroscience to social science: Vol 1 Mechanisms of imitation and imitation in animals, Cambridge, MA,US: MIT Press 205-210.
Jones’s position as regards what is NOT the function of mirror units
- Mirror units are not direct transducers of observed behaviours to executed behaviours. P207 ‘ they respond to both sensory input and motor events; they do not respond to sensory input with motor events’
- ‘the idea that mirror units link observed actions directly to stored ‘motor plans’ also seems wrong!’ Mainly because when you consider the simplest of actions the number of factors involved make each action ( eg reaching) unique not least because of variations, even very small variations, in context.’
Jones’s critique of Gallese
+
Likes Gallese’s view ‘ mirror units as sources of the experience of common experience with other people, animals or robots like ourselves’ His proposal that ‘ mirror units are part of the mechanism for the automatic, sub-personal, non-propositional recognition and understanding of others’. Also that ‘This recognition and understanding of just the nature of others’ behaviours might then feed into an understanding of the intentions and states behind these actions’ ie it might lead to empathy
(KRO mirror units as general understanding of others rather than a specific understanding of an other)
Jones sees such knowledge and understanding as a prerequisite for imitation
( KRO again
general understanding/awareness of others leads to specific ideas about the intentions etc of another which might require the process of imitation.
? – on three points for Gallese’s claim for mirror unit involvement as a transducer , by direct mapping perception to action in imitative behaviour of infants, specifically tongue protrusion behaviour. ( note his only claim for the involvement of mirror units in imitation).
- Jones suggests that this ‘resembles the classic reflex loop rather than the mirror unit activity as observed in Gallese’s own experiments’
- Tongue protrusion often cited as possibly imitative behaviour of young infants but this does not take place in a one to one fashion. In Meltzoff & Meltzoff experiments it was ‘wehile the model was not tongue protruding that the infant’s tongue protrusions were most numerous ie no co-concurrence ( KRO ? need co-presence for co-concurrence)
- Jones (1996) has shown tongue protrusion behaviour to flashing light and Jones (2001) to music. Is tongue proptrusion in infants due to arousal
Jones’s proposition ( based on the positive aspects of critique of Gallese)
She sees the important property of mirror neurons that ‘ they can fire for a specific instance of a broader category of actions – but not know whether it was mine or yours . What would such cells be good for if not to blur the lines between me and you and let us each know the other to be like ourself’
