Bransford et al

Bransford et al ( for position chapter)

Quotes

P217

‘history & principles that animate each tradition’

‘look for conceptual collisions that shape, challenge and extend’

Synergy aims for next decade – bring together three separate strands -

1. Implicit learning & the brain
2. Informal
3. Formal

1. Implict learning and the brain

P210 ‘ refers to information that is required effortlessly (?KRO for CMC style) and sometimes without conscious recollection of the learned information or having acquired it’

P210 ‘ implicated in many types of learning that take place in both formal and informal educational settings’

P211 ‘occurs in many domains. For example it influences social attitudes and stereotypes regarding gender & race’….

‘young children’s imitative learning of tools/artefacts’…

‘media and technology’

‘evolutionary value….. enables organisms to adapt to new environments simply be being in them and observing and interecting with the people and objects encountered there ( Howard & Howard, 2001)

Focus on language learning & learning about people ( social cognition)

3 hypothesis

p211

• implicit learning plays an important role across the lifespan
• research on language has discovered principles of learning that emphasize the importance of patterned variation and the brain’s coding of these patterns and these findings may illuminate other cognitive and social domains.
• Curriculum implications

Interpreting brain data

P212 – things to note

‘valid inferences about brain processes often require a series of converging experiments rather than one or two’

‘learning induced changes in the brain involve biological processes that may have complicated and interacting pathways of regulation just like other biological processes ‘ ( KRO puts into context questions about how meaningful it is to know where brain activation occurs)

p213 - fact

In young children the brain ‘overproduces’ synapses.

‘the process of synaptic overproduction takes place at different rates in different part of the brain ( Huttenlocher & Dabholkar, 1997)’

Ideas

Kuhls ( language development specialist) ideas on ‘neural commitment’

e.g. p213 ‘ early neural commitment to phonetic units of a specific language supports the learning of more complex patterns, such as the words of a language. However, neural commitment to learned patterns also constrains future learning because neural networks dedicated to native language patterns are incompatible with non-native patterns’

i.e. interpretation ‘ critical period depends on experience as much as process’ – ‘ maturation may ‘open’ the period during which learning can occur, but learning itself may play a powerful part in closing the period’ ( KRO provides a fairly powerful explanation of the interaction between biology and the environment’)

p214

‘broadening the discussion the neural commitment concept can be thought of as a neural instantiation of important dimensions of expertise in any domain’ i.e. expertise a s filter to ‘ focus attention, structure perception, thought and emotions so that we work more efficiently’

frees up attention, perception, emotion for creative endeavour

raises a fundamental question ‘ how can the brain form neural commitments whilst maximising our ability to stay open to adaptive change?’

Focus on language learning & learning about people ( social cognition)

See previous hypothesis under this title

Focus in particular

Language learning

· Acquisition of language

· Second language learning

( KRO adds text based asynchronous online learning)

human interaction

· live – Kuhn seems to be advantaged in language learning ? why ? evolutionary preparadness.

· mediated

Implicit learning & its connection with imitation

p215

‘Children’s implicit learning from other people a case of imitative learning’ ( this a section heading and is quoted as it is quite explicit about the connection between implicit learning & imitation.

‘ubiquitous nature of imitation amongst humans across the lifespan’ ( eg Metzoff, 2005)

‘monkeys do not imitate. So imitative behaviour involves more than the presence of mirror units and neuroscientists are trying to determine the special, perhaps uniquely human abilities that support our proclivity for learning by observation ‘ ( review by Meltzoff & Decety, 2003)

‘one possibility is that even the simple act of Imitation is connected with perspective taking and therefore is a more social & collaborative activity than first appears ‘( Meltzoff, 2005)

2. Informal learning

(KRO links to communities of practice)

• During a lifetime over 90% of learning occurs outside of school
• There are divergent views on the value of informal learning and the quality of thinking involved
• This strand describes research from a wide range of settings were informal learning takes place eg dairy workers, Lebanese tailors.

two main settings

1. designed e.g. museums

2. emergent, often self organised e.g. playgrounds

( KRO how does CMC, online, social networks, digital native etc fit ? is it a mixture of the two?)

Historical perspective

P217

‘Traditionally mostly outside mainstream educational psychology’

two main strands

1. Anthropology 1900-1950, Mead ‘her version of the social actor ……. In constant need for guidance from others’

2. Sociological ethnography Becker, 1950s, full expression 160s, 1970s

e.g. becoming a marihuana user, 1953.

‘Becker argued against an exclusively skill based notion of learning, that has been characteristic of both behaviorism ( physical skills) and cognitivism ( mental skills). Becker’s critical addition was to show that learning also involved the development of particular meanings for a skill, which were learned among other community makers’

bearing in mind that marihurana is not necessarily nic –

‘Becker argues that becoming a marihurana user requires that one learns to experience the sensations of smoking as pleasurable, through the appropriation of a set of socially transmitted meanings of experience.’

The historical account just reviewed

Foreshadows Guided participation ( Rogoff, Matsusov & White)

Resonates with guiding and participating (Mead)

Locates the development of identity as a dimension of learning (e.g. Becker & Casper, 1956) – central to the understanding of informal learning n.b. Becker’s work – school is a lousy place to learn.

Contributions of this strand (2)

1. Context of learning

P219

‘ although studies of informal learning have been used to cast a critical eye on the traditional practices of schooling and to provide ideas for formulating alternative educational practices, the focal attention to context as a theoretical construct among informal learning researchers has led to a more general reinterpretation of school as a context, namely that it is one’ and just one so to look at some contrasts

p220

formal ( eg school) - apparatus of school ‘ intentional teaching, designed and sequenced curricula, regular individualised assessments

informal

1. apprenticeship – legitimate peripheral participation ( Lave and Wenger)
2. intent participation – Rogoff et al – ‘ learning happens through keen observation and listening, in anticipation of participation ……. ( children) observe and listen with intent concentration and initiative, and their collaborative participation is expected when they are ready to help in shared endeavours’ (Rogoff, 2003, p176)

‘understanding learning in this way attends to how individuals can learn without explicit teaching but through participation in a community’s ongoing activities’

2. learning as change - what changes?

Cognitivists – mental constructs

Informal learning

Forms of participation in ongoing cultural activities

Changes in identity

Tool mediated embodied skills

therefore

p221

‘suggest reframing in terms of context rather than informal/formal e.g. transitions are a context and we need ‘ a better understanding of what people bring to, take from, and adapt across different contexts may also have implications’

3. Designs for formal learning and beyond.

This section starts off by highlighting two important achievements so far

1. development of standards ( national & international)
2. learning from the cognitivists – expertise & noticing. (Noticing comes from what it takes to be an expert ). ‘If people fail to notice subtle examples that create disequilibrium, they do not experience the need to attempt to change their views’

how to teach expertise

it requires

• knowledge organisaiton
• identify enduring ideas
• important things to know and be able to do
• ideas worth mentioning
• connections

but it needs to be adaptive ( see innovation section) and effective it needs to be alert to considering implementation alongside the background of the teacher’s knowledge which may have moved from explicit to tacit. It also raises questions for assessment – eg how to assess adaptive expertise.

Considering expertise further raises the question of how to balance efficiency and innovation

to encourage efficiency. Cognitive psychology has been useful here in that scripts, schema, procedures are all ideas that are translatable into classroom practice.

to encourage innovation . p226 need to ‘help people resist assimilation’ e.g. be able to restructure out thinking in social situations’ Need to engage in knowledge building as well as knowledge telling ( Scardamelia & Bereiter, 1991) and encourage disconfirmation as well as knowledge building ( Karmiloff- Smith & Inhelder, 1774/1975)

Future synergies

Methodological

? Synergy between methodology i.e. neuroscience, ethnographic analysis of social interactions & classroom based approaches eg activity theory.

Theoretical

P227

‘researchers from all three of the strands are begining to explore the implications of the idea that people – from infancy to adulthood – seem to naturally pay attention to other people and learn from them’

Examples from each strand

S1 and imitation – ‘human children are socially attuned from birth ‘ in particular to faces, voices. Infants observe and imitate

Stimultated research as follows

A focus on higher order questions such as empathy, the neural basis of empathy and of competition and collaboration ( Decety et al , 2004)

S2 p227 ‘ groups where people know each other function differently from groups of relative strangers’

Collaboration leads to bettwr problem solving and groups outperform individuals

‘quality of conversations and nature of shared engagement mediates how much is learnt’

researching how to stimulate more and better collaborations.

S3 social cognitions ( scripts) . Stimulated talk about humaine learning ‘ let students learn about content whilst also learning about people’

Sharing research tools

P228

An example is Learnlab at the Pittsburg Centre.

‘Seven ‘ highly instrumented courses’ ……. Each available for use in real classrooms’ state of art ( technologically and pedagogically)

Searching for conceptual collisions.

(cf 3Cs of DSE212)

ps read this section again if using this resource in a different context.

There are pros and cons of trying to align conceptual collisions. Some examples of collisions are

• Preconceptions ( including expertise) & commitments ( including neural)
• Meaning and understanding
• metacognition . how does reflection play out across the three strands.

One way forward is to anchor collisions around phenomena

• We learn from experience; previous experience can involve different kinds of learning eg implicit, informal, formal all contribute.
• We need to think in terms of implicit and informal learning occurring alongside formal (curriculuar learning) sometimes simultaneously e.g. learning about the self, others, morality ( fishing trip example) i.e. multiple levels of simulutaneous learning. Does this clash (collide) with the idea that attention needs to be explicitly focused?
• Common to all three strands is the influence of social interactions therefore provide opportunity for a wide variety of distributed expertise. Think in terms of motivation coming from being able to contribute.

support for cognition & emotion interaction

Fredrickson, B.L. & Branigan, C. (2005)

Positive emotions broaden the scope of attention and thought action repertoires

Cognition and Enmotion, 19,3,313-332

The broaden –and-build theory (Fredrickson, 1998,2001) hypothesises that positive emotions broaden the scope of attention and thought-action repertoires. Two experiements with college students tested these hypotheses. In each, participants viewed a film that elicted (a) amusement (b) contentment (c) neutrality (d) anger or (e) anxiety. Scope of attention was assessed using a global-local visual processing task (Experiment 1) and thought-action repertoires were assessed using a Twenty Statements Test (Experiment 2). Compared to a neutral state, positive emotions broadened the scope of attention in Experiment 1 and thought action repertoires in Experiment 2. In Experiment 2, negative emotions, relative to a neutral state, narrowed thought-action repertoires. Implications for promoting emotional well being and physical health are discussed.

Niedenthal et al ( 2005)

Niedenthal, P.M., Barsalou,L.W., Winkielman, P., Krauth-Gruber, S., & Ric, F. (2005)

Embodiment in Attitudes, Social Perception and Emotion

Personality and Social Psychology Review, 9, 3, 184-211

Multi modality nature of experience a central part of the theory of embodiment described in this paper

Theoretically pitched against amodal theories of concept formation. For me it is an alternative but no convincing argument that it is THE alternative.

KRO comment experimental evidence that is reviewed ( both cognitive and social) relies heavily on approach ( as a positive inidcator ) and avoidance ( as a negative indicator).

Wide range of example of imitation and mimicry ( note described under social perception and to an extent emotion)

Raises the issue of unconscious processes

Prior/alternative theory - Amodal architectures

Computer metaphor influential

Makes two claims

p186

1. ‘ software of the mind is independent of the hardware of the body’ i.e. ‘any sufficiently complex physical system could have human intelligence. In principle the software that constitutes the mind ( including the ‘social mind’) could run on anything – neurons, silicon or even wooden gears – as long as the elements were arranged in proper functional relations.’

2. ‘’high level cognition ……. Is performed using abstract, amodal symbols that bear arbitrary relations to the perceptual states that produce them ( Newell & Simon, 1972). Mental operations on these amodal representations are performed by a central processing unit that is informationally encapsulated from the input ( sensory) and output ( motor) subsystems ( Fodor, 1983). The only function of the sensory unit is to deliver detailed representations of the external world to the central unit. The only function of the motor system is to dutifully execute the central executive’s commands.’ ‘For example, on interacting with a particular individual, amodal symbols redescribe the experienced perceptions, actions, and introspections to establish a conceptual representation of the interaction in long-term memory. As a person’s knowledge about such interactions grows, the underlying amodal symbols become organized into structures that represent concepts extracted across experience (e.g., Collins & Quillian, 1969).These abstracted concepts constitute the person’s knowledge’ schemata e.g. social scripts.

Authors note that there is no empirical evidence for such systems but nevertheless they have gained wide acceptance not least because they are a way of accounting for the operation of knowledge across a wide range of examples. Also the ideas have been successfully applied to the implementation of intelligent systems.

The authors position statement regarding embodied cognition

Recent theories of embodied cognition p185 ‘view knowledge acquisition ( KRO - ?simulators) and knowledge use (KRO ?simulation) as processes grounded in the brain’s modality-specific systems.’ (KRO note – on page 188 authors review experimental evidence to support their claim for embodied cognition and use neuropsychology reports of modality specific function to support their claims but do not explain why they support embodied cognition although I agree that they are compatible. However it can also be argued that they are compatible with amodal theories).

‘’Our view of what knowledge is determines how we conceptualise perception, memory, judgement, reasoning and even emotion. It is generally agreed that the processing of any mental content, including social and emotional content, involves internal symbols of some sort- mental representations. ‘ but ‘What are mental representations ? …. How do they derive their meaning?’

Embodiment effects in Cognitive Psychology

Online embodiment ( related term, situated cognition)

P187 ‘refers to the idea that much cognitive activity is intimately tied to relevant modality specific- processes required to interact with the environment effectively. For example, when meeting a new individual (e.g., a tall and imposing person), a perceiver spontaneously produces in vivo sensory and somatic responses (e.g., looking up and feeling apprehensive) as well as motor responses (e.g., stepping back to keep distance). The embodiment account views these sensory, somatic, and motor responses as necessary for the encoding and interpretation of the new individual……. A central tenet of recent theories is that the establishment of this repertoire plays a central role in higher cognition’.

Offline embodiment ( ? symbolic)

‘Just thinking about an object produces embodied states as if the object were actually there. (KRo implies that the object, or person, is already known). …. To establish the meaning of symbols during offline processing people rely on repertoires of modality-specific responses acquired previously during online e processing of these symbols’ referents’.

Embodiment effects in Social Psychology

Three areas reviewed for social psychology namely attitudes, social perception & emotion

Attitudes

Summary p 190 ‘ The studies described in this section on attitudes demonstrate two embodiment effects of interest. First, during online exposure to objects, the production of motor movements associated with positive attitudes leads to the later expression of positive attitudes, and the production of motor movements associated with negative attitudes leads to the later expression of negative attitudes. Second, during offline cognition, processing symbols that stand for absent attitude objects are most efficient when a congruent (KRO another example of the use of congruence/incongruence to test and support theory) motor behaviour is maintained, suggesting that representing conceptual knowledge involves the relevant behaviour’

Social Perception

Imitation and mimicry.

Reviews research that show that perceivers imitate the facial gestures of perceived others.

Importantly, imitation extends beyond facial behavior. Individuals engaged in conversation tend to synchronize their latency and rate of speech, the duration of their utterances, and other speech characteristics (e.g., Capella & Planalp, 1981; Matarazzo & Wiens, 1972; Webb, 1972). Listeners also tend to mimic talkers’ emotional prosody (e.g., Neumann & Strack, 2000), manual gestures (e.g., Bavelas, Black, Chovil, Lemery, & Mullett, 1988; Maxwell, Cook, & Burr, 1985), and even their syntactic constructions (e.g., Bock, 1986). Much research has focused on postural synchrony. For example, in one study Bernieri (1988) had judges code the postures of two individuals filmed while they were actually interacting with each other and the same two individuals who appeared to be interacting with each other but who were actually interacting with different people. Supporting the idea of imita tion, the results revealed greater postural synchrony for two individuals engaged in actual interaction than for two individuals in a contrived interaction (for related results, see Bernieri, Reznick,&Rosenthal, 1988; Bernieri & Rosenthal, 1991).

It is widely believed that synchrony facilitates cooperation and empathy among interaction partners (e.g., Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1993; LaFrance, 1985; LaFrance & Ickes, 1981; Neumann & Strack, 2000; Semin, 2000). Consistent with this belief, enhancing mimicry increases smoothness of interaction and liking between partners (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999).

Calls on mirror unit data to show that their conclusions about embodied cognition are consistent with neuroscience data.

Emotion

P192

“Emotion imitation appears to be relatively automatic and to even be elicted outside awareness,( Dimberg et al, 2000).

P192 ‘According to embodiment views, bodily responses should facilitate cognitive processing of emotion stimuli. In one demonstration of this effect, Wallbott (1991) had participants categorize the emotional facial expressions displayed in photographs of other people. As participants categorized the photographed expressions, their own faces were surreptitiously videotaped. Results showed that the participants tended to mimic the facial expressions as they categorized them. When they categorized happy faces, for example, they smiled themselves. Furthermore, participants’ accuracy in classifying the facial expressions was positively correlated with the extent of mimicry. The more participants mimicked the faces, the better they were at discerning what expression the face was displaying.’

P193 ( in the context of offline) reviewed experimental evidence to show that ‘participants’ memory performance was maximized when the motor behaviour, the emotional state, and the emotional meaning of the material were all compatible’

Theory/Frameworks for Embodied cognition

Perceptual Symbol Systems (PSS) account ( Barsalou, 1999) note: central assumption that simulation underlies conceptual processing eg stereotypes as a social psychology exemplar of conceptual processing ( KRO not sure how emotion fits in other than as a modality)

Takes a starting point Damasio’s (1989) theory of convergence zones (CZ) which rely for functioning on sensory specific feature detectors.

P194-195

The theory that informs ideas of CZ architecture assumes that systems of feature maps reside in the other sensory–motor modalities and in the limbic system for emotion. All these maps operate in parallel, so that while a face is being represented in visual feature maps, sounds produced by the face are being coded in auditory feature maps, affective responses to the face are being coded in limbic feature maps, bodily responses to it are being coded in motor feature maps, and so forth.

CZ theory further proposes that conjunctive neurons in the brain’s association areas capture and store the patterns of activation in feature maps for later representational purposes in language, memory, and thought. Damasio (1989) referred to these association areas as convergence zones.

CZs capture only conjunctions of lower-level zones (so that CZs can later coordinate their feature level reactivation)—they do not constitute some form of “grand” representation that independently represents all lower levels of the representational hierarchy. Second, during knowledge use (e.g., conceptual processing and recall), the cognizer activates the multiple modality-specific regions that encoded the experience, rather than, as traditionally assumed, only the “final” abstract regions at the end of the processing streams.

Two important claims made by this theory

P195

1. ‘ The modality –specific processing that occurred in reaction to a previously encountered stimulus can be reenacted without the stimulus being present.’ Ie facilitates offline embodiment. ……..’ this reentrant mechanism is now widely viewed as underlying mental imagery in working memory (e.g., Farah, 2000; Grezes & Decéty, 2001; Kosslyn, 1994)….

2. Unlike typical assumptions about imagery it does not require the reenactment process to be conscious.’

To explain how the cognitive system uses this distributed knowledge PSS relies on two central constructs, simulators and simulations.

Simulators – integrate modality specific information across a category’s instances.

P195 ‘ assumes that when different instances of the same category are encountered over time and space, they activate similar neural patterns in feature maps.( Farh & McClelland, 1991). In time CZ respond to these regular patterns so that the repetition establishes a multimodal representation ( simulators) of the category, a concept.

P196 ‘simulators can combine to construct complex representations that are componential, relational and hierarchical’

Simulations

Simulation involves using CZ architectures to trigger feature map information. ( Thus simulation is also a distributed representation, see them as residing in long term memory ) p196

‘According to PSS, the simulation process is highly dynamic and context dependent. It is dynamic in that a given simulator can, in principle, produce an infinite number of simulations. Depending on the current state of the simulator, the current state of associated simulators, the current state of broader cognitive processing, and so forth, a unique simulation results (Barsalou, 1987, 1989, 1993, 2003b). The simulation process is context dependent in that the simulation constructed on a given occasion is tailored to support situated action (Barsalou, 2002, 2003b).

Using simulators and simulations

P197-198it is often argued that modality-specific approaches fail because they cannot represent abstract concepts such as truth. As we have seen, however, PSS establishes simulators, not only for components of the external world, but also for components of introspection, including emotions, motivational states, cognitive operations, and so forth. Barsalou (1999) proposes that abstract concepts are abstract because they focus heavily on introspections and complex situational events. In contrast, concrete concepts are concrete because they focus on physical entities, settings, and simple behaviors in the external world. Because simulators can be established for introspections and events (not just for concrete objects), they can in principle represent the conceptual content of abstract concepts (not just the content of concrete concepts). including emotions, motivational states, cognitive operations, and so forth. Barsalou (1999) proposes that abstract concepts are abstract because they focus heavily on introspections and complex situational events. In contrast, concrete concepts are concrete because they focus on physical entities, settings, and simple behaviors in the external world. Because simulators can be established for introspections and events (not just for concrete objects), they can in principle represent the conceptual content of abstract concepts (not just the content of concrete concepts). To assess this hypothesis, Barsalou and Wiemer- Hastings (in press) used the property listing task to assess the content of abstract concepts (truth, freedom, invention) and of concrete concepts (car, sofa, bird). After participants listed the properties of these concepts, detailed coding schemes were applied to assess the content produced. Most notably, the general types of content for abstract and concrete concepts were highly similar. For all concepts, participants tended to describe situations that included objects, people, settings, behaviors, events, mental states, and relations. For both types of concepts, participants situated their conceptualizations of them, not just representing the focal category content, but also representing extensive background situational content relevant to understanding and using the category. The two types of concepts differed in their focus on this content. Whereas concrete concepts focused on entities, settings, and simple behaviors, abstract concepts focused on introspections, social entities, and complex events. Furthermore, the abstract concepts were more complex, including greater relational structures, organized in greater hierarchical depth. This exploratory study did not assess how participants represented this content. In principle, though, it seems possible that all of this content—for both concrete and abstract concepts—could be simulated. Everything that participants mentioned is something experienced either in the external or internal world.

Situated conceptualization is a central construct in the PSS framework. P198 ‘ A situated conceptualization simulates the focal category entity, along with simulation of likely setting, actions and introspections. Because the simulation includes the conceptualizer’s actions and introspections, the simulation creates the impression of ‘being there’ with the category member. As a result the conceptualizer is well prepared to interact with the entity in the anticipated situation.’……..

‘Later, these embodiments, when experienced, can trigger the situated conceptualization via the inference process of pattern completion. Specifically, the experienced embodiment

activates a larger pattern that contains it, with non perceived aspects of the pattern constituting inferences about the situation. Conversely, if through linguistic conversation, the situated conceptualization becomes active, it can, in turn, produce corresponding embodiments via the same inference process.’ ….

The PSS framework, with its construct of multimodal, situated conceptualization, accounts for the diverse collection of social embodiment effects reported in the literature. Consider priming effects on behavior, as when exposure to words associated with the elderly stereotype produces slower walking (Bargh et al., 1996). On the PSS account, stereotypes are situated

multimodal conceptualizations of social categories. In the case of the elderly stereotype, its content includes embodiments of slow motor movements.

Support for PSS ( Simulation hypothesis)

1. Modality switching costs

P200 ‘when the modality of property description changed from first to second trial participants were slower to verify

2. Instructional equivalence

Compare situations when simulation is emphasized and when it is not emphasized ( KRO relevance to guiding people in how best to interact online) Sets this up as a contrast with what amodal theories would predict. Need to read this section again p200.

3. Perceptual effort

Related views

Zajonc & Markus (1984) chapter entitled affect and cognition. Authors focused primarily on the interaction between emotion & cognition. They argued that bodily movement has representational content.

For example, Zajonc and Markus (1984) proposed that people’s particularly good memory for faces reflects their ability to imitate perceived faces and to create hard muscular representations that complement soft representations

Z& M theory was primarily associative and lacked the dynamic aspects of PSS

Criticisms of embodiment theories

Selective embodiment

P204 ‘Embodiment theories need to solve the problem of how some cognitive activity can proceed without involvement of bodily states and modality-specific simulations. PSS addresses this issue with the distinction between shallow versus deep processing. ( KRO)– however this would not apply to text based CMC) A perceiver simulates primarily when needed. When conceptual tasks can be solved using shallow strategies, such as word association, simulations of conceptual content are not recruited or play only peripheral roles’

Dynamic use of embodiment

P204 ‘ When an external factor compromises validity of a simulation in one modality, people can switch to a simulation in an alternative modality’ ( KRO I’m not convinced by this argument how is a judgement of lack of validity made)

Representational limitations of the body

P204 ‘Embodiment theories must address the problem of the body’s representational capacity. Starting with Cannon (1927, 1929), critics have argued that bodily feedback is too undifferentiated and too slow to serve as the basis of experience. Furthermore, there is the

problem that the same bodily state may be associated with different cognitive and emotional representations (Zajonc & McIntosh, 1992). These issues are actually quite old and have been effectively used by Cannon and many others to argue against the James–Lange theory

of emotion (James, 1896/1994). Several responses to this criticism are possible. Zajonc and Markus (1984) note that the motor system can support extremely subtle distinctions, as the sophistication of sensory-motor processing in spoken language illustrates. Further, even a limited number of bodily states can support a very large number of representational

distinctions. (Consider how many melodies can be played with 88 piano keys—a number much lower than the number of muscles in the body.) More important, recent embodiment approaches, such as PSS, CZ theory, and Somatic Marker Theory (Damasio, 1999), avoid the “body-is-too-crude-too slow- and-too-varied” criticisms by focusing on the brain’s modality-specific systems, instead of on actual muscles and viscera. The circuits in modality-specific brain areas are as fast and refined as any other form of cortical representation and are thus able to flexibly process a large number of modal states at the same time (Damasio, 2003)’

Higher cognitive functions

In particular whether or not the theory is able to represent abstract concepts. Argues that this is achieved through simulations of introspective experience.

Regressing to behaviorist or mere associations

Authors ascertain that this is not the case however they don’t provide a refutation just a statement that it is not the case.

Correlational or causal.

Some criticisms involved a challenge about cognitive embodiment as causal in conceptual processing ( see my own critique of Niedenthal ( 2007). Authors argue that evidence reviewed demonstrate causality but I am not convinced without detailed scrutiny of alternative explanation especially since most of the evidence is based on an experimental paradigm.

Amodal theories make the same prediction.

P205 most of the author’s rebuttal rests on the following ‘ Just because ampodal theories can be configured post hoc to explain any embodiment effect is not impressive. What would be more impressive is if they predicted these effects apriori’

Also see previous description of amodal theories namely that conceptual system is functionally & physically separate from the modality-specific systems and that knowledge abstracts over the dtail of the experience.

Niedenthal 2007

Niedenthal, P.M., (2007)

Embodying Emotion

Science, 316, 1002-1005.

Embodied cognition:

P1003 ‘ High level processes ( such as thought and language) use partial reactivations of states in sensory, motor and affective systems to do their jobs. Put another way , the grounding for knowledge – what it refers to –is the original neural state that occurred when the information was initially acquired’……. ‘Populations of neurons in the modality-specific sensory, motor and affective systems are highly interconnected and their activation supports the integrated, multimodal experience……… ‘Critically for such an account one reason that only parts of the original neural system are activated is that attention is selectively focused on the aspects of the experience that are most salient and important for the individual.’

suggests that perceiving and thinking about emotion involve

• perceptual
• somatovisceral
• motoric (KRO new element when compared with other theories)

reexperiencing of the relevant emotion in one’s self.

Provides experimental evidence to show that when emotion is induced in human participants by manipulations of facial expression, posture in the lab, it effects how emotional information is processed. ( KRO but the induced emotion was rather nebulous e.g. choice of pen, ‘good news’ not least because only the receiver can realistically judge whether news is personally good or bad. However in the 2005 paper this evidence is described in the section about attitudes and in particular the part that behavioral action plays in manifesting an attitude ).

Quotes some evidence for the effects of emotion on cognition

Priortizes attention (ref 6)

Access to word meaning ( ref 7)

Organisation of material in memory ( ref 8).

What would be the mechanism behind embodied cognition?

Ref 19 for a range of accounts., including mirror neuron system

Perceiving emotion

? due to an overlap of brain areas involved in expression & recognition.

Adolphs (21) recognising a facial expression of emotion involves embodiment of the implied emotion.

Evidence ( which doesn’t actually convince me, it seems to be describing a correlation between site of expression and site of recognition rather than providing and explanation) p1004 ‘ researchers had partipants inhale odors that generated feelings of disgust (22). The same participants then watched videos of other individuals expressing disgust. Results showed that areas of the anterior insula and, to some extent, the anterior cingulated cortex were activated when individuals observed disgust in others and when they experienced disgust themselves

Has Implications of theories of embodied cognition for imitation & observational learning.

Provides an explanation as to why emotional expressions and gestures of others are imitated by observers. When emotional imitation goes smoothly there is a strong foundation for empathy.

Also some evidence that observational learning is supported by reenactment of the emotional experience of the model in the observer. Published comparisons of amygdala activation during conditioned observational, and instructed fear learning in humans are consistent with just such a view. ( Phelps, 31).

Thinking about emotion

Niedenthal Recorded face muscles whilst participants were making judgements about emotional associations of concrete and then abstract words. Results for both types of stimuli ( concrete, abstract) p1004 ‘ showed that in making their judgements, individuals embodied the relevant discrete emotion as indicated by their facial expression. When asked to make a non emotional judgement ie whether words are in upper or lower case, findings showed no systematic activation of facial muscles.

Comprehending emotional language.

P1005 ‘ claim that language comprehension relies in part on embodied conceptualisations of the situations that language describes ( ref 38). The first step …… to index words or phrases to embodied states that refer to these objects. Next, the observer simulates possible interactions with the objects. Finally, the message is understood when a coherent set of actions is created.’

Evidence - Ref 40 ‘if the comprehension of sentences with emotional meaning requires the partial reenactment of emotional bodily states then the reenactment of congruent ( or incongruent) emotions should faciliate or inhibit ( kro -how does the inihibition pattern work from a neural point of view?) language comprehension. Task – to judge whether a sentence describes a pleasant or an unpleasant event , while holding a pen between the teeth ( to induce smiling) or between the lips ( inhibit smiling). Sentences that described unpleasant events were understood faster when participants were prevented from smiling.

Vygotsky lecture on Emotion

Vygotsky, L.S. (1987) “lectures on Psychology’ in L.S. Vygotskii, R.W.Rieber and A.S. Carton (eds), The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky. Volume 1: Problems of General Psychology pp. (325-337). New York: Plenum Press.

Lecture 4

Emotions and their development in Childhood.

1930s views about emotion

• Attempts to describe sequential relationships of an emotion prevailed.
• Distinction between higher and lower emotions – a form of dualism also V refers and therefore recognises judgement as a psychological process.
• Related to the former point is the developmental nature of emotional life both in the life time of an individual and in an evolutionary context. From instinct – to – aesthetic.

V’s interpretations

V interpreted the James work as p328 ‘ the internal organs provide the foundation for the emotions’ ‘ similarly to Ribot James defined a theory where in V’s opinion ‘ emotions are torn from a unified whole, from the rest of man’s mental life. The James Lange theory provided the anatomical and physiological foundation for this notion’ also ‘theory stripped emotions from consciousness’ he therefore saw Canon’s work as important in that it p332 ‘shifted the emotions from the periphery to the centre’ ( at that point he links up with Freud ).

(KRO - Emotion as a pruning of animal behaviour

Cognition as a development of animal behaviour)

Review approach

Darwin P325 ‘ ‘In sketching the evolution and origin of human expressive movements, Darwin was pursuing his basic evolutionary concept’ it was accepted by religious tradition ‘from their perspective Darwin had shown that man’s earthly passions ….. do actually have animal origins’

Ribot - (1897) The Psychology of Emotion. P326 ‘ emotions…. Are the sole domain of the human mind that can only be understood retrospectively’ ….. ‘man’s affective reactions are remnants of his animal existence, remnants that have been infinitely weakened in their external expression and their inner dynamics’

Fear as inhibited flight, anger as inhibited fight

Spencer argued that p326 ‘ if we compare animals with man, the child with the adult, or the primitive with the cultured man, we see that the emotions fall back to a less prominent plane as the development process moves forward.’ i.e. logical conclusion that man will become a – emotional.

Comment -Vygotsky p326 ‘ our immediate psychological experience and our experimental research demonstrate the absurdity of this position’

James – Lange P326 ‘ Independently of one another, Lange and James assumed the task of locating the source of the vitality of the emotions in the human organism itself . Each followed his own path, James consciously as a psychologist and Lange as a physiologist. Both found the source of vitality of the emotions in the organic reactions that accompany emotional processes’ ‘key to this theory was the introduction of a change in the traditional view of the sequential relationship between the various components of the emotional reaction’

i.e previously perception : experience of emotion : reflexively elicited organic change then J-L perception : reflexively elicited organic change : emotional experience.

P327 ‘ critics argued that James and Lange wanted to reduce human feelings to the reflection of organic processes in consciousness’

P328 ‘James himself argued that it is the historical period of man’s development that higher human feelings of a kind unknown to animals have been developed and perfected’

Comment ‘ Vygotsky p327 ‘ nowhere, for example, were the higher and the elementary functions separated so clearly as in James’s theory of emotions. The further development of his theory was consistently based on this initial separation of the higher and lower emotions.’ ‘ he isolated the emotional experiences that are directly intertwined with our thinking processes , those that constitute an inseparable part of the integral process of judgement, from organic foundations’

Canon

A physiologist who used a range of method contemporary at the time. Evidence challenged the J-L claim that each basic ‘emotional trigger’ leads to a specific pattern of visceral change’ i.e. Canon showed that the organic expressions of different emotions such as rage, fear etc are identical. For example Canon removed a significant part of an animal’s sympathetic nervous system p300’ According to James if we mentally subtract organic expression eg shivering, heart rate, we will find nothing remains of emotions. Canon attempted this subtraction experimentally and found that emotions remain..’ i.e. emotional states are present in animals that lack the corresponding vegetative reactions. Similarly when subjects were injected with substances known to stimulate autonomic reactions similar to those experienced during emotion, it depended on the prior state of the organism as to whether or not these would be effective. ( KRO hence onwards to Schacter and Singer). Overall the J-L theory did not stand up to experimental evidence of Canon ( the physiologist). P331 however ‘as a biologist, Canon had to explain the paradox that emerged from his experiments. If the profound organic changes that occur with intense emotional reactions in animals are completely inessential for the emotions, if the emotions are preserved despite the elimination of all these organic changes, why are these changes necessary from a biological perspective?..............’Canon explained the contradiction in the following way: An intense emotional reaction in an animal is not the end but the beginning of an action. A reaction of this kind arises in a situation of critical life significance for the animal’ …… The organic reactions associated with emotions exist not for the emotion as such but for what logically follows the emotion’ i.e. preparation of the organism for action….. p332 ‘the bodily symptoms are not so much the companions of the emotions as supplements to certain emotional factors that are associated with instincts’ implied that during evolution emotions have become isolated from the ‘ instinctive domain’.

Freud

Dismissive of organic explanation so of emotion. Whatever the current view of Freud’s contribution to the study of emotion he did p333’ demonstrate that the emotions were not always as they are in adult life……. They cannot be understood outside the dynamic of human life. It is within this context that the emotional processes acquire their meaning and sense’

Adler

P333 ‘ demonstrated that in man the functional significance of the emotions is not linked exclusively to the instincts as it is in animals. The emotions are one of the features which constitute the character of an individual’s general view of life. The structure of the individual’s character is reflected in his emotional life and his character is defined by these emotional experiences’

Buhier

P333 ‘took the critique of the Freudian perspective on emotional life as his point of departure’ he argues that what constitutes pleasure changes during development. In this way similar to Freud he sees pleasure as a motivator. However Buhier ‘when pleasure occurs in an activity shifts in accordance with the degree of the child’s development, changing it relationship to other mental processes with which it is connected’

Initially during development pleasure comes at the end. At a later stage e.g. early stage of children’s play, p334 the child receives satisfaction not so much from the result of the activity as the process itself’. Necessary part of gaining essential skills and habits for survival as a human being.. Finally the focal point shifts to onset of an activity p334 ‘ the characteristic of the process involved in creative play.

Claparede

P335 C raises an important question ‘how do we explain the fact that human emotions become more varied with every step mankind takes on the path of historical development. This development and differentiation of the emotions leads not only to the kinds of disorders of mental life that have been explored by Freud but to the entire vast and diverse content of mankind’s mental life including domains such as art………. Why are the individual’s experiences associated with such intense emotion? Why is every critical moment in the fate of the adult or child so clearly coloured by emotion?’